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Abstract
Improved consumer information about (symmetric) products can lead to better
matching but also higher prices, so consumer surplus can go up or down, while prots
rise. With enough rm asymmetry though, the stronger rm's price falls with more
information, so both eects benet consumers. This is when comparative advertising
is used, against a large rm by a small one. Comparative advertising, as it imparts
more information, therefore helps consumers. While it also improves protability of
the small rm, overall welfare goes down because of the large loss to the attacked rm.
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Until the late 1990s, mentioning a competitor's brand in an ad was illegal in many EU coun-
tries. This situation was ended by a 1997 EU directive that made \comparative advertising"
legal subject to the restriction that it should not be misleading. This brought the European
approach closer to that of the FTC in the US. In other countries, comparative advertising re-
mains illegal, or little used (see Donthu, 1998, for a cross-country comparison). The rationale
for a favorable attitude towards \comparative advertising" on the part of competition au-
thorities is that it improves the consumers' information about available products and prices
(see Barigozzi and Peitz, 2005, for details and a wealth of examples and discussion). This
raises a number of questions for the economic analysis of informative advertising. What is
the scope of a practice that involves disclosing information that the product's supplier would
choose not to reveal? Is the benet to consumers from improved information mitigated by
a welfare loss for competitors who are (presumably) hurt by comparative advertising about
their products? Are consumers hurt by higher prices because product dierentiation rises
due to comparative advertising about product attributes?
The FTC's position is admirably clear: \Comparative advertising, when truthful and
non-deceptive, is a source of important information to consumers and assists them in making
rational purchase decisions."1 This view underlies our modeling approach. The FTC also
expects performance benets: \Comparative advertising encourages product improvement
and innovation, and can lead to lower prices in the marketplace." To a very large extent we
corroborate these conclusions.
Here we consider a game between rival rms and their incentives to provide information.
Consumers do not know the characteristics of a rm's product unless they are revealed
through advertising, although consumers have (correct) priors about their evaluations. Firms
1The STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING by the Federal Trade
Commission, of August 13, 1979, is to be found at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-compare.htm
1are fully aware of each other's product attributes. If comparative advertising is illegal, then
rms can only inform consumers about their own goods. Comparative advertising allows a
rm to also inform consumers about rival product attributes that the other rm might not
wish to communicate. We also address the welfare economics of comparative advertising.
Evaluating the impact of comparative advertising requires identifying when it changes
the information available to consumers. That is, there must be some information that
rms would not disclose if restricted to direct advertising, and that will be brought out if
comparative advertising is allowed. In much of the literature on informative advertising, it
is the cost of advertising that limits the information transmission by rms (see the seminal
papers of Butters, 1977, Grossman and Shapiro, 1984, and the review coverage in Bagwell,
2007). Anderson and Renault (2006) show that a monopoly rm might limit information
about its product attributes even if advertising has no cost. This result is a starting point
for the present paper because it identies situations where a rm is hurt by information
disclosure about its own product, so that there might be some incentives for competitors to
provide that information through comparative ads.
The paper contributes to the economics of asymmetric oligopolistic competition by rst
indicating how quality-cost advantages feed into equilibrium prices and sales. Second, it
provides results on the impact of increased product information on market outcomes: while
more information tends to increase prots, and welfare when qualities are similar, welfare can
be harmed with more information due to price distortions when qualities are quite dierent.
Third, it provides some predictions on when comparative advertising might be used { by
smaller rms with cost or quality disadvantages { and welfare implications.
There is curiously little economics literature on comparative advertising, although in
marketing there is quite a lot of documentation of the phenomenon and discussion of its
eectiveness (see Grewal et al., 1997, for a comprehensive survey).2 Barigozzi and Peitz
2A recent paper by Thompson and Hamilton (2006) shows subjects four dierent ads, with dierent
2(2005) give a survey and some background modeling of alternative approaches.
Barigozzi, Garella, and Peitz (2006) take a signalling approach. An entrant with uncer-
tain quality confronts an incumbent whose quality is known. The entrant chooses between
\generic" advertising, which is standard money-burning to signal quality (as in Nelson, 1974),
and \comparative" advertising, which involves a claim comparing the two rms' qualities.
Firms may have favorable or unfavorable information about the entrant's quality but do not
observe it perfectly. If comparative advertising is used, the incumbent may litigate in the
hope of obtaining damages if the court, which observes quality perfectly, nds that it is low.
Comparative advertising may credibly signal favorable information about entrant quality
when a rm with such information expects it unlikely a court will nd its quality is low.
Aluf and Shy (2001) model comparative advertising as shifting the transport cost to
the rival's product in a Hotelling-type model of product dierentiation. While this is an
interesting angle in its own right, the modeling approach does not capture the informative
aspect of comparison advertising and is not micro-founded in information revelation. Instead,
it seems more like a model of (negative) \persuasive" advertising.
We consider the disclosure of horizontally dierentiated attributes (valued dierently by
dierent consumers), assuming that product qualities are known. Here, product qualities are
a device to indicate large or small rms in terms of their equilibrium market shares, and we
shall refer to the rms as strong (to be thought of as one with a quality advantage) or weak
(quality disadvantaged). If market sizes are very dierent (product qualities are suciently
dierent), the equilibrium to the disclosure game has only the weak rm disclosing horizontal
attributes and the strong one not. If comparative advertising is allowed, then the weak rm
will disclose the horizontal attributes of both products (and so it is truly comparative).
To see how the model works, it is rst useful to describe some background results which
nonetheless hold independent interest for the economics of product dierentiation and infor-
comparative and analytical cues and judges ad eectiveness by surveying participants' impressions.
3mation. First, under rm symmetry, or close to it, more match information makes for more
product dierentiation and therefore raises prices (as expected). As we show, consumers may
be better or worse o, as their improved ability to select the better match may be swamped
by the price hike. Nonetheless, rms are better o. Results are surprisingly dierent when
products are asymmetric, a case rarely treated by the literature. With zero horizontal match
information, Bertrand competition leads the weak rm to price at cost while the strong one
takes all the market by pricing at its quality advantage. Assume for the sequel this quality
advantage is large. If the match information for just one rm is known (the weak say), the
strong rm has to actually price lower to retain the whole market since it must attract the
consumer who likes the weak rm most. With full information, the strong rm must set an
even lower price if it is to retain (almost) all customers, since it must now attract the cus-
tomer who likes it least and likes its rival most.3 This means that not only are prices lower
when there is more information (more product dierentiation) but also the strong rm's
prots are lower the more information there is. However, the weak rm retains a foothold
under full information, so it prefers this.
This leads us into the advertising game analysis. Throughout the text we emphasize the
importance of rms' market shares by stressing two extreme cases, which allow for clean
analytical arguments. A specic example helps ll in intermediate cases.
Similarly sized rms share the same incentive to provide extensive horizontal match
information to maximize perceived dierentiation and relax competition. Then, comparative
advertising has no specic role insofar as full product information is provided regardless.
Dissimilar rms have quite dierent incentives to disclose horizontal match information.
Hence, allowing comparative advertising may have a signicant impact. This is best illus-
trated when the match distribution is such that the lower market share falls to zero when
3We show that the strong rm will never want to completely price the rival out under full information,
because the extra sales are not worth the lower price on infra-marginal units.
4information is only one-sided:4 we show that shares are always positive with full informa-
tion. As noted above, the strong rm prefers no information to one-sided information, which
in turn it prefers to full information, and it serves the whole market unless its competitor
can achieve full information through comparative advertising. Hence, neither rm adver-
tises (provides information) when comparative advertising is banned (because the weaker
rm can get no market sales by using direct advertising for its own product alone). When
comparative advertising is allowed, the weaker rm will provide full product information to
give itself some market share (and hence prots).
If rms are suciently dierent, it is socially optimal that all consumers buy from the
stronger rm. Then, comparative advertising deteriorates social welfare by letting the weaker
rm make positive sales: full information relaxes the strong rm's price incentive to capture
the whole market. Consumer welfare is improved though: full information brings down the
price of the strong product (which is otherwise consumed by all) and some consumers choose
to buy the cheap weak product which must therefore yield them higher surplus.
The text shows that these insights may remain valid even when the weak rm always
retains some strictly positive market share with one-sided information. Under fairly general
conditions, a suciently strong rm always prefers less information to more. We also show
that there is always some size dierence for which the weak rm uses comparative advertising
to achieve full product information, which the strong rm prefers obscured.
These results indicate that the benets of comparative advertising accrue to the weak rm,
and to consumers, with so much damage to the large rm that total surplus goes down. Al-
though we noted above that more information can raise prices (and may even hurt consumers
to the prot of rms, despite better consumer matching), this happens when comparative
advertising is irrelevant in the sense that incentives to divulge own product information are
already strong enough. When comparative advertising is relevant, the strong rm is at-
4Technically, the condition is that the match density is strictly positive at the top of its support: f (b) > 0.
5tacked by the weak one, and we are in the regime when more information actually reduces
prices (and enables better choices). This substantiates the FTC position that comparative
advertising improves competition, even though one might have worried a priori that more
match information would entail higher prices.
We provide an example with a Laplace distribution for match values with a complete
characterization of the equilibrium outcome and welfare properties as a function of rm
strengths. Results are fully consistent with those where the weak rm's market share vanishes
to zero under one-sided information. This example shows that the weak rm's prot can be
substantial enough to cover advertising expenses for comparative advertising.
Section 2 gives general background results for Bertrand duopoly with product dierentia-
tion. We outline the model in Section 3, describe demand under dierent degrees of product
information, and nd the corresponding equilibrium prices. These prices and prots are
compared in Sections 4 and 5, which paves the way for the equilibrium information disclo-
sure determined in Section 6. Section 7 shows some key surplus properties on the desirability
of comparative advertising. Section 8 covers the Laplace example, and Section 9 discusses
quality revelation, other extensions, and interpretation of the model. Section 10 concludes.
The longer proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 Some preliminary results
We rst give some results for duopoly pricing that are used quite extensively in the anal-
ysis that follows: demands will satisfy the properties used here. The results pertain quite
generally to dierentiated product Bertrand duopoly with covered markets.
Consider a duopoly where rms 0 and 1 set prices p0 and p1. Dene  as Firm 1's net
quality advantage,  = p0   p1 + Q, where Q 2 IR may be understood as a Firm 1's gross
quality advantage. Demand for Firm i's product is given by Di(), i = 0;1, where D1 is an
6increasing function taking values in [0;1] dened on IR. Further assume that D0 = 1   D1,
which may be understood as a covered market assumption: if heterogenous consumers have
unit demands, each consumer must buy either product (and total demand is normalized to
1). Production costs are assumed to be zero.
Assume that D1(0) = D0(0) = 1
2 so that, if Q = 0 and rms charge the same price, they
share demand equally. Thus, Q = 0 may be viewed as a symmetric case, whereas when
Q 6= 0, one rm has a competitive advantage over the other one in the sense that it may
charge a larger price than its competitor and still serve at least half the market (Firm 1
having the competitive advantage if Q > 0). This competitive advantage is presented for the
exposition as a quality dierence, but could also be (and is formally equivalent to) a marginal
production cost dierence (marginal costs being constant). To see this, simply reinterpret pi
as a mark-up over marginal cost. More generally the rm with the competitive advantage is
the one that has the larger dierence between its quality and its marginal cost.5
We rst establish a general result characterizing Firm 1's equilibrium net competitive
advantage, , and how it relates to the gross competitive advantage Q.
Lemma 1 Assume D0 = 1   D1, and D1() = 1
2 if and only if  = 0. Then in any pure
strategy (simultaneous choice) price equilibrium,  has the sign of Q and 0  jj  jQj,
with equality only if Q = 0. Therefore, in equilibrium, if Q = 0 then p0 = p1 and D0 = D1;
while if Q ? 0 then p0 7 p1 and D0 7 D1.
Lemma 1 is proved in the Appendix using revealed preference arguments. Whichever
rm has a competitive advantage retains that advantage in equilibrium and thus has higher
demand ( has the same sign as Q) but this advantage is somewhat mitigated because the
5To see this, let c0 and c1 denote rms' (constant) marginal costs, and dene mi = pi   ci as Firm
i's mark-up. Redene Q = (q1   c1)   (q0   c0) and set  = m0   m1 + Q. Then Firm 1's prot is
1 = m1D1 () and now view rms as choosing their mark-ups. Hence the formal analysis is unaected:
note that  = q1 p1 (q0   p0) so that the demand functions are just as before. The advantaged rm is now
seen as the one with the higher quality-cost, and all results that follow can be appropriately re-interpreted.
7weaker rm charges a lower price (jj < jQj if Q 6= 0). It also states that in the symmetric
case where Q = 0, rms must share the market equally. The present results extend those of
Anderson and de Palma (2001), who show such properties hold with the multinomial logit
demand model (and n  2 competing rms). We now put some additional structure on
demand in order to tighten the characterization of equilibrium pricing.
Assumption 1 There exist two, possibly innite, real numbers ` and u such that D1() =
0 if and only if   ` and D1() = 1 if and only if   u. Furthermore, D1 is dier-
entiable on [`;u] and D0
1 > 0 on (`;u).
Since D1 is increasing and D1(0) = 1
2, we must have ` < 0 < u. The dierentiability
assumption does not rule out a non-dierentiable point of D1 at either bound but merely
guarantees that there is a right derivative at ` and a left derivative at u. Henceforth we
use D0
1 (`) and D0
1 (u) to denote inside derivatives at these points. As we will see below,
dierentiability of D1 at ` or u has important implications for the market outcome.




1(). Since  = p0 p1+Q
and D0 = 1 D1, the derivatives of each rm's demand with respect to the rm's own price
are equal and given by  D
0
1().
For  2 (`;u), equilibrium prices must satisfy standard rst-order conditions setting

















From equation (1) we derive a simple xed point condition that fully characterizes  as a







recalling that  = p0   p1 + Q, we then have
Q =    g(): (3)
In order for equations (1) and (3) to be relevant, it is necessary that in equilibrium 
falls strictly between ` and u. As we prove in the Appendix, this will be the case for all
Q, if D1 is dierentiable at ` and u, which means if the inside derivatives are zero there.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1, in any pure strategy Nash equilibrium,  2 [`;u]. Fur-
thermore, if for some k 2 f`;ug, D1 is dierentiable at k, then  6= k for all Q 2 IR.
The above results characterize the equilibrium provided that it exists. Further regular-
ity conditions must be imposed on D1 to guarantee existence as well as uniqueness of an
equilibrium. We thus assume the following.
Assumption 2 D1and D0 are strictly log-concave on [`;u].
This means that lnDi is strictly concave, so D0
i=Di is strictly decreasing.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there is a unique pure strategy price equilib-
rium, such that p0, p1, , and prots satisfy
1. If `   1
D
0
1(`) < Q < u + 1
D
0
1(u), then  is given by (3) and p0 and p1 are given by
(1). Furthermore  is strictly increasing in Q with d
dQ < 1;
6Equation (1) also yields a quick proof (given dierentiability) for Lemma 1. When both demands are
positive, the rst-order conditions are pi =
 Di()
D0
i() (as per (1)). Since in any equilibrium, D0
0 () =  D0
1 ();
then higher prices are associated to higher demands. But since D0 (0) = 1=2, the rm with the lower demand
has a higher net quality. That is, p0 < p1 holds if and only if D0 < D1 and if and only if  > 0. Taking
the rst and last inequalities, this can be only true if Q > 0. The equality results follow along similar lines.
Intuitively, a quality (or cost) advantage is re
ected in a higher mark-up and yet higher demand since the
quality advantage is only partially oset with a higher price.
92. if Q  `   1
D
0
1(`), then  = `, p1 = 0 and p0 = `   Q;
3. if Q  u + 1
D
0




5. whenever Firm 1's demand is strictly positive, its prot is strictly increasing in Q and
whenever Firm 0's demand is strictly positive, its prot is strictly decreasing in Q.
Thus, whether or not equilibrium entails positive demands for both rms for all Q boils
down to whether or not the demand derivative is zero at the point where one demand becomes
zero. To understand this, suppose there is a zero derivative at (a nite) u.7 Then, even for
very high Q, it will not be worth Firm 1 pricing out Firm 0 when p0 = 0, because the mass
of last customers to get on board becomes vanishingly small at a high price (approaching
Q   u) and loses revenue on the existing consumer base. With a nite derivative, the
trade-o becomes attractive at a high enough quality.
3 The model
Consumers are interested in buying one unit of one of two goods, which are sold by separate
rms. The intrinsic benet of the product class is large enough that all consumers buy one of
the two products. Each product's specication is summarized by consumer valuations, which
are assumed independently, identically, and symmetrically distributed around zero with log-
concave density f (:), distribution function F (:), and support [ b;b]. Hence f (x) = f ( x)
and F (0) = 1=2. We write consumer utility as
ui = qi   pi + ri; i = 1;2; (4)
7Of course, the argument also holds for an innite u but the nite case is more striking and bears better
juxtaposition with the case of a nite derivative.
10where qi is product i's quality (identical for all consumers), pi its price, and ri is the con-
sumer's (idiosyncratic) match value. We consider an experience good so purchases depend
only on expectations of match values.
In the information disclosure game analysis below, we study rms' equilibrium choices of
whether to impart information about own match values, and about match values with rivals
when comparative advertising is permitted. Information is disclosed in the rst stage, and
price competition is the second stage. We therefore need rst to analyze the price sub-games,
as a function of the information available. These sub-games have independent interest as
they indicate how prices and performance depend on the extent of information available to
consumers.
Throughout, we assume that consumers observe prices (for example, in the store where
purchases are made). They also know qualities: this can either be viewed as a direct as-
sumption or else it follows from the analysis of Section 6 that if qualities are unknown to
consumers, rms will reveal them in equilibrium (this is an extension of the basic \persuasion
game" of Milgrom, 1981). However, absent advertising, consumers do not know their match
valuations. Firms can advertise their own product specications if they so wish. Such \pos-
itive" advertising will allow consumers to know their realizations of ri. If rms are allowed
to advertise rival product specications, either they only do that (\negative advertising")
and consumers know their realizations of rj, or else a rm can advertise both product spec-
ications, so consumers then know both ri and rj, a situation we refer to as \comparative
advertising." Even though there is nothing untruthful in comparative or negative advertis-
ing, this may be information that Firm j may choose not to reveal on its own. If there is no
information on Firm i's product specication (and hence the value of ri), consumers must
form expectations of their benets from buying from Firm i. Consumers cannot otherwise
acquire any information through search.8 We next describe demand under the alternative
8As shown in the online version, an alternative phrasing of the model with a search good instead of an
11consumer information states that might arise from advertising.
3.1 No information
If neither rm advertises, the consumers know only the expected value from purchasing from
either of them. Since the mean match value is zero (by the assumption of symmetry of f),
expected utility is
ui = qi   pi:
Products are ex-ante homogenous except for the quality dierential. Firm 1's demand
is then zero if  < 0, and one if  > 0. If  = 0, we invoke a standard tie-breaking rule
that assigns all demand to Firm 1: since we assume Q  0, this corresponds to an ecient
allocation when Q > 0, and has no bite when Q = 0.
The price equilibrium under no information is quite straightforward. It follows from
a standard Bertrand equilibrium argument that the low quality rm sets a zero price in
equilibrium and the high-quality one serves the whole market at a price of Q.9 Since the
market size is normalized to unity, Q is also Firm 1's equilibrium prot.
3.2 One-sided information
Here we characterize the demand (indicated with a bar) that ensues when the information
advertised concerns only one of the products (for example, only one rm advertises its
product specications). Suppose that Firm 0's match is known. Then, since the expected
experience good, as in Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999, 2000), gives rise to an equivalent
formulation as long as the search cost is high enough.
9Without further restriction, any price premium of Q with the price of the high quality rm between 0
and Q, is an equilibrium outcome to this game. Anderson and de Palma (1987) show that the equilibrium
we select is the unique limit of equilibria in a horizontally dierentiated market, as product heterogeneity
goes to zero. This eliminates equilibria where the weak rm (which makes no sales) prices below marginal
cost.
12match value with Firm 1 is zero, the relevant utilities are
u0 = q0   p0 + r and u1 = q1   p1:
These expressions give rise to a demand facing Firm 1 given by Pr(u0 < u1) or
 D1 = Pr(r0 < ) = F (): (5)
Since the support of r0, the random variable underlying F (:), is [ b;b] we have here that
 D1 () = 1 for   u = b, and  D1 () = 0 for   l =  b, and Assumptions 1 and 2
are satised for this demand. Hence Proposition 1 holds.
We now argue the demands in such a situation are independent of which rm's match
values are known (so the result is the same). Indeed, if Firm 1's match is known and Firm
0's match is unknown, the utilities relevant to choices are u0 = q0 p0 and u1 = q1 p1+r1.
The demand facing Firm 1 is then  D1 = 1   F ( ). However, this demand expression is
the same as (5) since symmetry of f implies F (x) = 1   F ( x). In summary:
Lemma 3 If information is one-sided, each rm's demand does not depend on which rm's
match values are known.
Thus it makes no dierence which rm's matches are known (given only one rm's are).
This means there is no systematic bias in the model to favor negative or positive advertising.10
Under one-sided information, from the analysis of Section 2, whether or not one rm is
excluded from the market in equilibrium depends on whether Q is high enough and whether
the derivative of demand is positive or zero at the upper bound. Since that derivative is
simply f (b) (where b = u in the earlier notation), then we immediately have the following
result as a corollary to Lemma 2 and Proposition 1.
10This result depends on the symmetry of f. Skewness would bias the incentives to reveal or not.
13Corollary 1 Suppose information is one-sided. Then equilibrium demands are both positive
regardless of Q if f (b) = 0. If f (b) > 0, then for Q  b + 1
f(b), Firm 1 serves the whole
market in equilibrium and sets a price p1 = Q   b while p0 = 0; for lower Q the market is
shared and p0, p1, and  are given by equations (1)-(3). Lastly,   ! b as Q ! 1.
Note that the case f (b) = 0 covers the case when the support of match values is the
extended real line. With a nite support and f (b) > 0, the quality-advantaged rm (1)
prices so as to just retain the individual enjoying the highest regard for Firm 0, which is the
individual who has a match r0 = b. This compares to the mean value of 0 for Firm 1.11
3.3 Full information
Consumers know exactly their match values with both products if they have been advertised.
Indeed, for what follows, it suces that they only know the dierence in values, r1 r0, that
is, the comparison between products. Arguably, this information might be easier to disclose
than an absolute match value.
A consumer with full information purchases product 1 if and only if
q1   p1 + r1  q0   p0 + r0
or equivalently r1 +   r0. The probability a consumer with a realization r1 buys from




F (r1 + )f (r1)dr1 (6)
and e D0() = 1   e D1(), where full-information demands are characterized with a tilde.12
11Equivalently, as per Lemma 3, Firm 1 must price so that the consumer least enamoured of it (holding
r1 =  b) nonetheless buys against an expected value of 0 with Firm 0.
12By Lemma 1 we can concentrate on the case   0. Then (6) becomes ~ D1 () = R b 
 b F (r1 + )f (r1)dr1 +1 F (b   ). Demand can be visualized as the area of the unit square of con-
sumer valuations accorded to each rm. The division line (indierent consumer type) satises r1 = r0   ~ ,
which is a diagonal line. If ~  > 0, Firm 1 attracts all those consumers for whom r0 < ~  irrespective of their
valuation of r1: hence the nal term in the demand function.
14The range of values of  for which e D1() is strictly between 0 and 1 is from l =  2b
to u = 2b, and Assumptions 1 and 2 are satised for this demand. These bounds arise
because these are the values for which at least some value of F (r1 + ) in (6) is neither zero
nor one. For example, if  = 2b, even the consumer who least likes product 1 and most likes
product zero (that is, (r0;r1) = (b; b), or, indeed, r0   r1 = 2b) will just switch to buying
product 1 because its net quality advantage is so high.
Although this demand function has the whole market served by Firm 1 if   2b, this
never happens in equilibrium. This property is a direct corollary of Lemma 2 and Proposition
1. Since for  > 0 we can write (6) as e D1() =
R b 




 b f (r1 + )f (r1)dr1 and this expression is zero for  = 2b. This puts
us always in Case 1 of Proposition 1, which proves the next point.
Corollary 2 Suppose full information prevails. Then equilibrium demands are positive re-
gardless of Q. Equivalently, the equilibrium  is always below 2b and p0, p1, and  are given
by equations (1)-(3). Lastly, ~  ! 2b as Q ! 1.
Even though Firm 1 has the ability to price 0 out of the market, it never exercises the
option because the marginal gain in consumers is so small even when the stakes (the price)
are very large.
4 Equilibrium pricing for equal qualities
We now consider pricing sub-games conditional on information states induced by advertising
decisions in the rst stage of the game. Since the match density function, f, is log-concave,
arguments from Caplin and Nalebu (1991) guarantee that Assumption 2 holds so that
existence and uniqueness under one-sided or full information follows from Proposition 1.
We rst compare equilibrium prices under symmetry of qualities (q0 = q1). If there is no
information, products are viewed as perfect substitutes and a standard Bertrand argument
15gives prices both equal to marginal cost, which we recall is zero.
With one-sided information, demand for Firm 1 is given by (5)) which, for Q = 0 yields
 D1 = F (p0   p1). Thus demand for Firm 0 is  D0 = 1   D1 = 1 F(p0  p1). Using Lemma





With full information, e D1 =
R b
 b F (p0   p1 + r1)f (r1)dr1 (see (6)). Again from Corollary







These prices are compared below.
Proposition 2 If Q = 0, then ~ p   p > 0, where the rst inequality is strict for distributions
other than the uniform. That is, prices are higher under full information than under one-
sided information than under no information.




2 (r)dr  f (0)
Z b
 b
f (r)dr = f (0);
or, from (7) and (8),  p  e p. Equality is only attained with a uniform density, so then prices
are equal. Otherwise,  p < e p. Since demand is split 50{50, prots are also higher (unless f is
uniform) under full information. Both prices exceed the no-information zero price.
With equal qualities, prots are simply equal to half the equilibrium prices. This makes
the case that more product information is better for rms (see also Meurer and Stahl, 1994).
Another way to think of this is to note that full information (when r1 r0 is known) is a mean
preserving spread of r1 alone (one-sided information), which in turn is a mean preserving
spread of 0 (no information). This progression reveals less product dierentiation and hence
lower prices.
16Full match information is the information state (for equal qualities) that gives the highest
total welfare. This is because there is no allocation distortion due to unequal prices, and full
information enables consumers to reach the rst-best solution that each consumer buys her
highest match.
The symmetric quality case underscores the product dierentiation advantage imparted
by full information over limited information. However, the result that a higher degree of
information delivers higher equilibrium prices may lead to welfare losses if the model is
broadened to allow for non-purchase.13 This is one potential strike against the benets of
informative advertising generally (and not just comparative advertising.)
In conclusion, a symmetric setting delivers no distinctive role for comparative advertising.
Nor does it enable much useful debate about the welfare benets of comparative advertising.
For that, we turn to the case of quite dierent qualities. Note that results under symmetry
will hold in the neighborhood of Q = 0 since the various prot and surplus functions are
continuous and comparison inequalities are strict at Q = 0.14 This enables us below to state
results for situations where rms are roughly of equal size.
5 Asymmetric qualities and information states
We rst establish a (non-equilibrium) result which will be used later for the asymmetric
cases, and helps build intuition for the results. The expressions compared are demands
under full and one-sided information (see (5) and (6)) for given prices.15
13For another example, consumers might have price sensitive demands that depend also on their match
values. With full information, those that like the product a lot can buy a lot, and conversely: there is a
welfare loss when there is less match information since "one-size ts all" in demand.
14Except for the uniform, where the price equality between one-sided and full information requires us to
evaluate explicitly what happens for Q > 0.
15This inequality is related to Jensen's inequality. We compare the expected value of some functional
transformation of a random variable with the value of that function evaluated at the expected value of the
random variable; Jensen's inequality compares these quantities under a convexity assumption on the func-
tional whereas we consider a functional that is rst convex and then concave. For the uniform distribution,
F(r+) is piecewise linear and a quick proof of the result may be obtained by applying Jensen's inequality.
17Proposition 3 The rm with higher net quality has higher quantity demanded under one-
sided information than full information:
e D1 () =
Z b
 b
F(r1 + )f(r1)dr1  F() =  D1 ()
if and only if   0, with equality if and only if  = 0.
One-sided information gives a demand advantage to the rm with a net quality advantage
because consumers impute the average valuation (0) to the unknown match value. The
situation can also be interpreted as that of a monopolist facing a (known) outside option: a
"strong" monopolist will therefore prefer not to advertise specic match values. This insight
underpins results in Anderson and Renault (2006) where high search costs play eectively the
role of an attractive outside option (so the monopolist is more likely to want to advertise).
The result also suggests that were we to allow more rms, strategic eects aside, lower quality
ones are more likely to wish to prefer fuller information. We return to this point below.
While the Proposition suggests that Firm 1 is better o when information is one-sided
because it has higher demand for given  > 0, it is less clear whether the equilibrium 
also favors it, since one might also suspect that it could support a higher price under full
information insofar as this means greater perceived product dierentiation. The prot results
are proved next, rst determining the eect on prot of rival price and then own price.
For the next two results, a strong demand state refers to the one for which a rm's
demand is higher for all , given the advantage conferred by Proposition 3. Let ~ i and  i,
i = 0;1 denote a rm's equilibrium prot under full and one-sided information respectively.
Lemma 4 Assume Q > 0. A rm's prot in its strong demand state is strictly higher than
in its weak demand state if its rival's equilibrium price is higher in the strong state. Hence:
1. if ~ p1   p1 then ~ 0 >  0.
182. if  p0  ~ p0 then  1 > ~ 1.
Proof. First assume that ~ p1   p1. Under full information, Firm 0 can always select a
price such that  =   so that, by Proposition 3 and since   > 0 for Q > 0, its demand is
higher than with one-sided information. Furthermore, the corresponding price is  p0+~ p1  p1 
 p0 so that its prot is strictly higher than with one-sided information. A symmetric argument
shows the other part of the Lemma.
Intuition for this lemma is simple. In either informational state, our model has the
standard property that a rm may achieve higher prots if its rival charges a higher price
because the rm can achieve the same price dierence and hence the same demand while
charging a higher price. If in addition the state at which the rival's price is higher coincides
with that at which demand is higher at any given price dierence, then that state is clearly
more protable. However, a fundamental tension is that rivals may charge lower prices in
rms' strong states, meaning that we have to go deeper into the model to resolve rms'
information revelation incentives, which we do in the next lemma and the next section.
Lemma 5 Assume Q > 0. A rm's prot in its strong demand state is strictly higher than
in its weak demand state if its own equilibrium price is strictly higher in the strong state.
Hence:
1. if  p1 > ~ p1 then  1 > ~ 1.
2. if ~ p0 >  p0 then ~ 0 >  0.
Proof. Assume  p1 > ~ p1. If  D1( )  ~ D1(~ ) then the result clearly holds. Thus assume
~ D1(~ ) >  D1( ). Using the rst order conditions we have  p1 =
 D1( )
 D0




that we must have ~ D0
1(~ ) >  D0
1( ). Furthermore we must also have ~ D0(~ ) <  D0( ).
Using these two inequalities and the rst order conditions for Firm 0 we have  p0 > ~ p0. This
implies, applying Lemma 4, that one-sided information is more protable for Firm 1 than
19full information, which proves the rst part of the lemma. The other part of the lemma is
proved in a similar fashion.
This lemma tells us that if we show that a rm charges a higher price in its more favorable
information state then this is enough to guarantee that it earns a higher prot in that state.
This result follows from Lemma 4 along with both rms' rst-order conditions for prices.
We next use the results above to determine prot relations for Q large.
5.1 Price and prot relations for large quality dierences
The next two results use the property that log-concavity of 1 F (as implied by log-concavity
of f) means
1 F()
f() is decreasing. Since it is positive, it reaches a nite limit `  0 as  ! b.
Lemma 6 Assume b is nite. Then as Q tends to innity,  p0 and ~ p0 tend to the same nite
limit and  p1   ~ p1 tends to b.
Proof. Since   ! b and ~  ! 2b as Q ! 1, we have limQ!1( p1   ~ p1) + (~ p0    p0) = b.
Showing that ~ p0   p0 tends to zero as Q ! 1 therefore suces to establish the result. Since
 p0 = [1   F( )=f( ), then  p0 ! ` as Q ! 1. Furthermore we have:
~ p0 =
R b ~ 
 b [1   F(r + ~ )]f(r)dr
R b ~ 





f(r+~ ) f(r + ~ )f(r)dr
R b ~ 
 b f(r + ~ )f(r)dr
:






f( b+~ ) , so
`  ~ p0 
1   F( b + ~ )
f( b + ~ )
:
Since ~  ! 2b as Q ! 1, ~ p0 ! `, and the result follows.
Note that the limit, `, is 0 if f (b) > 0 or indeed if any higher-order derivative is non-zero
(by l'Hopital's rule). Then both  p0 and ~ p0 tend to zero.
20Firm 1 charging a higher price with one-sided information than with full information
implies from Lemma 5 that it prefers one-sided to full information for Q large. In the
following Proposition we show that it prefers no information under some mild technical
assumptions.
Proposition 4 Assume b is nite and Q is suciently large. Firm 1 strictly prefers one-
sided information to full information. If in addition ` < b, then Firm 1 strictly prefers no
information to one-sided information.16
Proof. The rst part follows directly from Lemmas 5 and 6. With no information, Firm
1 serves the whole market at a price of Q and thus earns a prot of Q. With one-sided
information, Firm 1 charges  p1 =  p0     + Q. As Q ! 1,   ! b and  p0 ! ` so that, if
` < b, then Firm 1's price is strictly below Q, which proves the second part.
What this means is that the quality advantaged rm may want to hold back information
and keep consumers uninformed.17 Nevertheless, the other rm's incentives may lie in the
opposite direction. As shown next, this would happen if the density f is dierentiable at b.
Proposition 5 For Q > 0, Firm 0 weakly prefers one-sided information to no information,
and strictly prefers full information to none. If in addition f0(b) is nite or f(b) = 0, and Q
is suciently large, then Firm 0 strictly prefers full information to one-sided information,
which is indierent to no information if and only if f(b) > 0.
Proof. For any Q > 0, the rst part holds since Firm 0 has no sales under no information
and has strictly positive sales at a strictly positive price with full information.
To prove the second part, recall that as Q goes to innity,   goes to b and ~  goes to 2b.
Also recall that Firm 1's equilibrium demand derivatives with respect to  may be written as
16The limit ` is 0 if f (b) > 0 or if any higher-order derivative is non-zero.
17This may not hold if individual demand were price elastic. Then consumers with a good match would buy
more { but those with bad matches would buy less. Without match information, all consumers purchasing
from 1 would buy an average amount, and so it is not clear which way this eect would play.
21 D0
1( ) = f( ) with one-sided information and ~ D0
1(~ ) =
R b ~ 
 b f(r + ~ )f(r)dr. For Q large,
 b + ~  > 0 and hence, f(r + ~ ) is decreasing in r on [ b;b   ~ ] (because f is log-concave
and symmetric with respect to zero) and hence ~ D0
1(~ )  f( b + ~ )F(b   ~ ).
Now, as Q tends to innity, both   and  b+ ~  tend to b. Hence, using the symmetry of
f with respect to 0, f( b + ~ )F(b   ~ ) may be approximated by [f( ) + f0( )( b + ~   




f( ) has a nite limit as   tends do b,
assuming that f0(b) is nite implies that
f( b+~ )F(b ~ )
f( ) tends to zero as Q tends to innity.
This proves that for Q large enough,  D0
1( ) > ~ D0
1(~ ).
From Lemma 6, for Q large we have  p1 > ~ p1 which, from Firm 1's rst-order conditions
is consistent with the above result only if  D1( ) > ~ D1(~ ), which implies that  D0( ) <
~ D0(~ ). Hence, from the above inequality between demand derivatives and Firm 0's rst-
order conditions we have ~ p0 >  p0: full information being Firm 0's strong demand state, it
follows from Lemma 5 that for Q large enough, Firm 0 earns more prot with full information.
Finally, with f(b) = 0 Firm 0's demand and prot are strictly positive for any Q with one-
sided information, whereas with f(b) > 0, Firm 0 has no market under one-sided information
for Q large and is therefore indierent between one-sided and no information, which are both
dominated by full information even if f0(b) is innite.
The above proposition says that for a large rm asymmetry, the small rm prefers more
information and this preference is strict except in the special case where it retains a positive
market share only with full information (when f(b) > 0) which makes it indierent between
no information and one-sided information. While the weak rm faces a lower rival price
under full information, the direct information eect of Proposition 3 dominates.
Comparative advertising can permit the low-quality rm to reach its preferred informa-
tion state (full), as is shown in the following section.
226 Equilibrium information disclosure
We can now address the equilibrium advertising strategies starting with the case when com-
parative advertising is debarred. Firms are viewed as setting advertising content before the
price sub-game is resolved, so there is a two-stage game in ad content and then pricing. In
the context of consumers going to the store for a pain reliever, they see all ads before going,
and they see all prices on arrival.18
If consumers have no information about a product's attributes, they use the expected
match value of zero. Otherwise, they know the match value communicated from any ads.
Recall that advertising is costless. We start with close qualities.
Proposition 6 If Q > 0 is small enough and comparative advertising is debarred. Then each
rm reveals its match in the only equilibrium. This is still an equilibrium when comparative
advertising is allowed.
Proof. For Q = 0, for any distribution apart from the uniform, from Proposition 2, each
rm's prot is strictly higher when it reveals information than when it does not, regardless
of the strategy of the other rm. By continuity, this property still holds for Q > 0 small
enough, hence the equilibrium stated is unique. For the uniform, the analysis in the online
version shows both rms strictly better o revealing than not. Both revealing own matches
is still an equilibrium when the comparative advertising is allowed since all information is
revealed by the rms separately, and so there is no extra information to be revealed.
18The game structure is also motivated by the empirical implausibility of the mixed strategy equilibria
that would result for some Q values if prices and advertising are chosen simultaneously. Indeed, there is no
pure strategy equilibrium for Q close to zero, whether comparative advertising is allowed or not. To see this
note that for Q = 0, rms share the market equally and  = 0 in any pure strategy equilibrium (regardless
of information disclosed). Each rm would clearly deviate from no information, so the relevant candidates
involve one-sided or full information. Then the analysis in Section 3 indicates that demand has a larger
derivative with respect to  with partial information which implies that each rm wishes to deviate from
one-sided to full information while increasing its price, and each rm would deviate from full to one-sided
information while decreasing its price.
23We exclude Q = 0 from the statement, but it holds for every distribution apart from
the uniform at this point. Even for the uniform, the equilibrium would be as stated if we
applied the tie-break rule in favor of divulging MORE information.19 We would not expect
a dierence to this result for more rms if they were roughly equal, because the price eect
of greater product dierentiation would encourage information revelation and the quality-
advantage eect noted in Proposition 3 would be small. An outside option would even
increase the incentive to provide information if it were relatively attractive.
Turning now to large Q, we rst deal with banned comparative advertising.
Proposition 7 If comparative advertising is debarred, ` < b nite and Q is large enough:
1. if f (b) > 0, neither rm reveals its match;
2. if f (b) = 0, only Firm 0 reveals its match.
Proof. (1) From Proposition 4, Firm 1's prot is higher when it does not reveal its
match information than when it does, regardless of the strategy of Firm 0 (note that if Firm
0 does not reveal, Firm 1 is better o not revealing because it serves the entire market in
both cases and price is higher when not revealing since it does not need to get on board
the consumer most disliking it). Given Firm 1 does not reveal, Firm 0 gets zero prots
regardless; by the advertising tie-breaking rule, it will not reveal (see Proposition 5).
(2) From Proposition 4, for Q large, Firm 1 strictly prefers one-sided information. Fur-
thermore, since f (b) = 0, Firm 0 earns a strictly positive prot with one-sided information,
but nothing with no information.
Firm 0's incentive not to disclose any information is weak if f (b) > 0: it is indierent
between revealing and not revealing because in any case it is kept out of the market. When
f (b) = 0, though, it earns a strictly positive prot by revealing.
19Given our rule, the uniform admits other equilibria since rms are indierent between one-sided and full
information (see Proposition 2). In particular, either rm alone revealing is also an equilibrium.
24The next result shows that comparative advertising by the high quality rm is irrelevant
to the market outcome. The result makes concrete the idea that comparative advertising is
done by the small rm. (The exponential example below gives an indication of the range of
values for which various equilibria arise.)
Proposition 8 Assume Q > 0. If one-sided information is weakly more protable for Firm
0 then it is strictly more protable for Firm 1. Hence, whenever there is a unique equilibrium
involving comparative advertising, the weak rm (0) attacks the strong rm (1).
Proof. From the contrapositive of Lemma 4, if one-sided information is weakly more
protable for Firm 0, then  p1 > ~ p1. Then, from Lemma 5, Firm 1's prot is strictly higher
with one-sided information. For the second statement, suppose the only equilibrium had
comparative advertising by 1. But the rst statement implies that Firm 0 too would strictly
prefer full information to one-sided, and we know that 0 prefers full information to none
(Proposition 5). This means comparative advertising by 0 must also be an equilibrium, a
contradiction to the postulated uniqueness.
In general, although comparative advertising has no impact on the market outcome for
similar market shares (Q small) since information is fully disclosed anyway, it changes the
situation quite strikingly for big asymmetries (Q large).
Proposition 9 If comparative advertising is allowed, and b is nite, there exists some qual-
ity dierence Q for which Firm 0 discloses all the horizontal match information using com-
parative advertising, while Firm 1 does not advertise match information at the unique equi-
librium. If in addition, f0(b) is nite or f(b) > 0, this situation prevails for Q large enough.
Proof. From Proposition 4, for Q suciently large, Firm 1's full information prot is
lower than for one-sided information. Since the reverse inequality holds for Q = 0 and prots
are continuous functions of Q, there is at least one crossing point where both situations are
25equally protable for Firm 1. Then, at the rst such crossing point Firm 0 earns strictly more
prots with full information (from the contra-positive to Proposition 8) and this remains
true for a slightly larger Q. Thus, for such a quality dierence, Firm 1 always prefers no
information while Firm 0 prefers full information. Therefore, if comparative advertising is
allowed, the unique equilibrium is as claimed. The nal part follows from Proposition 5.
Therefore comparative advertising promotes full information when rms are asymmetric
enough: the adverse price eect on the low-quality rm is overtaken by the benecial demand
information eect. The same tensions are likely to arise with several rms. Insofar as
information eects dominate, then we might expect the lowest quality rms to benet most
from comparative advertising. However, the fact that lowest qualities are not likely to see
much absolute improvement in demand means that it may be the middle range of rms who
most indulge in the practice: but this needs a dedicated model to address.
Who gains and who loses is underscored in the next section.
7 Welfare and consumer surplus
We consider two standards, total surplus and consumer surplus. We shall see that consumers
are better o (with Q large) when comparative advertising is allowed and used, so there is
full information: they get better matches and tend to have lower prices too. But total
surplus is lower (interestingly, despite a smaller distortion in prices; optimality would have
equal prices). This underscores the fact that the high quality rm is worse o.
7.1 Total surplus
We start with the case of similar rms.
Proposition 10 For Q close enough to 0, total surplus is highest under full information,
and this is implemented in equilibrium whether or not comparative advertising is allowed.
26Proof. In equilibrium, all information is revealed (Proposition 6). This is optimal,
given rm pricing, because in the neighborhood of Q = 0 prices are arbitrarily close so that
the consumer allocation is arbitrarily close to optimal. This indeed ensures the full social
optimum is arbitrarily close to being attained.
In this case there is no special role for comparative advertising and also no role for
expanding (or restricting) advertising. Matters are dierent for high Q.
Proposition 11 Welfare is lower when comparative advertising is allowed for Q large enough
with b nite and, f0(b) nite or f (b) > 0.
Proof. First note that for Q large enough it is optimal that all consume good 1, so that
the situation yielding the highest social surplus is when demand for product one is higher.20
From Propositions 9 and 7, the equilibrium changes from one-sided information to full
information with comparative advertising allowed. The proof of Proposition 5 shows that
for Q large, with f(b) > 0 or f0(b) nite, Firm 0's sales are higher with full information,
which establishes the result.
Comparative advertising leads to full information revelation,21 which harms welfare. This
is not because full information yields higher prices, since in this model high prices are not
intrinsically harmful since there is no deadweight loss from non-purchase.22 It is not even
the case that net prices are more distorted (in the sense of being more dierent for given Q)
under full information than one-sided or no information. Indeed, the equilibrium (which
is always below the optimal value of Q) is larger, and hence closer to optimal under full
information (Corollaries 1 and 2 to Proposition 1)! It is the information structure that
causes the welfare loss: from Proposition 3, one-sided information distorts the allocation of
20Demand is a sucient statistic for welfare as long as Q  2b, since no matter who consumes which
product, the greatest horizontal match dierence is 2b, and this is dominated by Q.
21This result does not depend on the tie-breaking assumption.
22The lack of an outside option is instrumental to this property. With enough quality asymmetry, prices are
actually higher under one-sided information than full information (Lemma 6). This means that consumers
may nonetheless be better o with comparative advertising, as we see next.
27consumers in favor of the high quality product and this outweighs the adverse impact of
equilibrium pricing that favors the low quality product whereas under full information, price
distortion is the only source of ineciency.
The above result is to be contrasted with the result for Q = 0 where full information un-
ambiguously improves social surplus over one-sided or no information. In that case however,
the socially optimal outcome of full information arises in equilibrium whether comparative
advertising is debarred or not. By contrast, for Q large, since Firm 1 strictly prefers one-
sided information, full information may arise in equilibrium only if comparative advertising
is allowed. Firm 0 deploys it whenever it prefers full information, and with Q large, this is al-
ways harmful. Comparative advertising though, by increasing Firm 0's prot, may enable it
to enter a market it could not enter otherwise. Hence, comparative advertising enhances the
ability to enter of low quality entrants but such entry is detrimental to social surplus. This
rather goes against the FTC's position of encouraging comparative advertising, although it
is important to think of consumers too: the next results validate the position.
7.2 Consumer surplus
Predictions on consumer surplus are in stark contrast with those on social surplus. For
identical qualities, predictions on which informational state would be preferred by consumers
are ambiguous since more information improves the match but leads to higher prices. For
a uniform distribution, full information is superior to one-sided information since prices are
the same in both regimes. With the Laplace distribution, one-sided information is better
for consumers than full information. However, no information is better for consumers under
both distributions.
For a large quality dierence we now show that consumer surplus is higher with full in-
formation so that comparative advertising by the low quality rm is desirable for consumers.
28This is easily seen in the extreme case where f(b) > 0.23 Then with one-sided information,
consumers all buy from the high quality rm while with full information, that rm charges a
lower price which improves the situation of those who still buy product 1 and some of them
switch to product 0, implying that they increase their surplus by doing so. We now show
that this result holds more generally.
Proposition 12 Consumer surplus is higher when comparative advertising is allowed for Q
large enough and, f0(b) nite or f (b) > 0.
Proof. The restriction implies that allowing comparative advertising changes the equi-
librium disclosure from one-sided to full information (Propositions 7 and 9). We now show
that consumer surplus is higher with full information under the milder condition that b is
nite. Recall from Lemma 6 that for Q large, a switch from one-sided information to full
information induces a drop in product 1's price. Hence all consumers buying product 1 with
one-sided information gain from such a switch and the corresponding increase in consumer
surplus is bounded below by  D1( )( p1   ~ p1). Furthermore, since only customers of Firm
0 with one-sided information stand to lose from the switch, the loss in consumer surplus is
bounded above by  D0( )(~ p0    p0). Since  D0( ) ! 0 and  D0( ) ! 1 as Q ! 1, the result
is a direct consequence of Lemma 6
The proof shows that consumer surplus is higher with full information even if f (b) = 0
for Q large enough. Most consumers then buy the high quality product which is cheaper
with full information. The only consumers who might be hurt by a move from one-sided
to full information are those who buy from Firm 0 in both instances, which is a vanishing
population for Q large. This means that comparative advertising enhances consumer surplus
whenever it is used. Better matches and lower prices are enabled for large rm asymmetries,
in contrast to the fundamental con
ict between these forces which can arise under fairly
23The next proof extends this result to f (b) = 0.
29symmetric rm strengths, which we highlighted at the start of this sub-section.
The full range of outcomes for the Laplace density is illustrated next.
8 An example: the Laplace distribution
Several of the results for the main text have been given for bounded densities. We have also
concentrated on results in the neighborhood of symmetric qualities, and for a suciently
large quality dierence. The Laplace example shows what can happen for intermediate













 x for x > 0:
Since the density has full support, Firm 0 retains a toehold under one-sided information,
no matter what the quality advantage of Firm 1. The symmetric equilibrium prices when
Q = 0 are readily calculated to be 2 for full information, 1 for one-sided information, and 0
for no information: prots are half this amount because the market splits equally.
The prots are illustrated as a function of Q 2 [0;5] in Figure 1. The 45-degree line is
Firm 1's prot under no information; Firm 0 nets zero. Clearly Firm 0 prefers full information
to one-sided to none. Simulations indicate that the prot dominance of full-information over
one-sided information prevails for all values of Q  0. This is consistent with our theoretical
results for Q = 0 and Q large. This pattern also implies that there can never be no
information in equilibrium, and full information ensues whenever comparative advertising is
legal.
Firm 1 prefers full to one-sided to no information for low Q, and the opposite for high
Q. Both concur with the earlier results. In the middle range, there are two patterns (no
24The uniform example given on the web version shows some slightly dierent patterns pointed out below.
30information on top or in the middle), but since no information is not a relevant market
outcome, we shall not dwell on these. Hence the relevant cases are those considered already
for low and large Q. In equilibrium, then, all information is revealed for low Q regardless
of the legality of comparative advertising. For large Q, only the low quality rm advertises,
and it will comparative advertise if that is legal.
Consumer surplus is illustrated in Figure 2, where we hold q0 constant and raise q1. As
expected, surplus is increasing in Q (given q0 is xed). This means that the high quality
rm cannot extract the full value of the extra quality in equilibrium, which is also in line
with Lemma 1: it is hurt by the competitive response of a lower p0. Consumer surplus for
low qualities is highest for no information, and lowest for full information. This is surprising
because one might expect the better matching eect of more information to not be fully
extracted by rms. However, no general result here is available, since consumer surplus for
the uniform example is highest under full information and lowest with no information.
For large Q we see here that full information gives highest consumer surplus (and no
information the lowest). In accord with the equilibrium analysis above, this shows that full
information is best for consumers for Q large enough, and so the possibility of comparative
advertising must raise their welfare. However, it is important that Q be large enough. The
example illustrates that consumers are actually worse o if comparative advertising is legal
for intermediate Q between around 3:7 and 5:8: in this range, one-sided information is the
equilibrium arrangement without comparative advertising, and this gives higher surplus than
full information, which Firm 0 uses if comparative advertising is legal.
From Figure 2, total welfare is highest under full information for low Q, and under one-
sided information for high Q (see Proposition 11). Here comparative advertising reduces
total welfare when used: the point where full information total surplus becomes smaller
(around Q = 4:3) exceeds where full information becomes less protable for Firm 1 (around
Q = 3:7), which is where Firm 0 starts using comparative advertising.
31Finally, this numerical example illustrates how protable comparative advertising may be
for the smaller rm. For Q = 3:7 where comparative advertising becomes a relevant practice,
Firm 0 nearly doubles its prot from :21 to :39 if it is allowed to use comparative advertising.
Note that its prot without comparative advertising is about 7% of its competitor's prot
(which is 3:03), so the incremental prot needs to cover any advertising cost in equilibrium.
9 Discussion
It was assumed above that qualities are known to consumers beforehand. We rst show
that if qualities are known to rms but not consumers, then rms will advertise qualities if
they can, so the basic set-up still holds.25 We then discuss some background to comparative
advertising in practice.
9.1 Quality disclosure
Let us now consider the possibility that qualities as well as horizontal attributes are un-
known. A standard result in the literature due to Milgrom (1981) and Grossman (1981),
is that a monopoly rm that may disclose certiable information about its product's qual-
ity, always discloses it in equilibrium. We now show that practically the same result holds
for our duopoly setting with horizontal dierentiation as well as vertical (quality), provided
that disclosure on quality information induces no updating on match values. Assume that
qualities for the two rms are independently drawn from the same distribution and that real-
izations are initially known only by rms. First note that no information disclosure is not an
equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, rms would engage in symmetric Bertrand competition
in the second stage and earn zero prot. It would be protable for a rm to deviate and
disclose its horizontal attributes thus creating some product dierentiation. Second, there is
no equilibrium where only the low quality rm discloses its quality. Recall that, independent
25If vertical qualities cannot be disclosed, expected qualities are used throughout the analysis.
32of what information is revealed about horizontal attributes, the high quality rm earns some
strictly positive prot that is strictly increasing in its quality. Suppose that for some given
low quality and horizontal attributes information disclosed, there is some non-zero subset of
high qualities that are not disclosed in equilibrium. The consumers form some conditional
expectation as to the quality of a rm that does not disclose so that any rm with a quality
above that conditional expectation is better o disclosing its quality.
Now consider the choice of a low quality rm. With no horizontal attributes disclosed
or if only one product's attributes are disclosed and the quality dierence is large enough,
it earns zero prots. Otherwise, its prot is strictly positive and strictly increasing in its
quality (Proposition 1). Whenever the latter situation arises, then an argument analogous
to that used for the high quality rm shows that the low quality is always revealed. The only
situation when the low quality rm cannot guarantee itself some strictly positive prot is
when the quality dierence is very large and comparative advertising is not allowed. Then,
the low quality is not disclosed but consumers update their beliefs accordingly and anticipate
the low quality is very low relative to the high quality. The only information disclosed in
that case is the higher quality and the high quality rm serves the whole market.
To summarize, the only situation where the market outcome would not be fully identical
to that obtained while assuming that qualities are known is when the quality dierence is
large and comparative advertising is not allowed. Then the low quality is not revealed but it
is anticipated by consumers to be much lower than the high quality. The market outcome is
qualitatively similar to that derived in previous sections where the quality dierence should
be replaced by the dierence between the high quality and some expected low quality.
9.2 On comparative advertising
Our theory focuses on rms' incentives to disclose information on horizontal match charac-
teristics. The rm with the smaller market share uses comparative advertising against its
33competitor, only if its market share is signicantly lower. The asymmetry in market shares
that we have modeled as a large Q may be due to factors other than a quality or marginal
cost advantage, such as consumer loyalty to a brand. Below we discuss the relevance of
focussing on horizontal match information rather than on quality information, and we argue
that results concur with some empirical regularities.
A typical comparative advertisement includes a claim that the product performs better
than some competing product(s). In one classic case, Subway claimed its sandwiches were
healthier than McDonald's; Advil claims it is faster and stronger than Tylenol. At rst
blush, these appear to be vertical quality claims. Whether they might be interpreted as
horizontal claims depends critically on the heterogeneity in consumer tastes and on the
consumers' perception of the potential product space. When a consumer learns that Subway
food is healthier, she may lean to Subway if she is strongly health conscious but she may
veer to McDonald's if she wants to get fed at a low cost and worries that Subway food is
not lling enough. This latter argument was actually used by Quiznos in a comparative
advertising campaign against Subway.26 Similarly, a consumer who learns that Advil is
faster and stronger than Tylenol might (reasonably, as it turns out) worry that the former
could cause harsher gastro-intestinal side eects. Whether strength and speed correspond
to higher quality depends on how dierent consumers value these attributes relative to the
potential perceived risks associated with taking the drug.
We argued above that if qualities were not known initially, each rm would certify its own
quality information so there is no specic role for comparative advertising on quality. An
obvious reason why a rm might not disclose its quality is that certication is imperfect or
costly (and this point applies to both horizontal and vertical quality). Perhaps too rms may
26"Quizno's is using marketing jujitsu eectively by attacking Subway's core value, low-calorie health-
fulness. Quizno's compares the generous amount of meat and cheese on their sandwiches to the skimpy
portions that make Subway low-fat, low calorie." from "Comparative advertising: Marketing jujitsu." at
http://www.brainposse.com/archivejujitsu2.html
34only certify relative qualities in practice because consumers are unable to evaluate absolute
quality claims. Then disclosing quality information requires using comparative advertising
as in Barrigozi, Garella, and Peitz (2007). Allowing for imperfect certication (see Shin
1994) is one research direction to explore, for both vertical quality and horizontal match
information. The analysis should also allow for disclosure of partial product information as
in Anderson and Renault (2006), since actual claims in comparative ads usually concentrate
on one dimension of the product space, which might be selected for strategic reasons. It
would also be worthwhile to introduce costly advertising reach into the model.
The idea that comparative advertising is successful only from small against large (\ju-
jitsu"), and not in the other direction, has been termed the Iron Law of marketing, and
examples abound.27 Anderson, Ciliberto, and Liaukonyte (2008) code TV commercials for
non-prescription (OTC) analgesics, a product category for which advertising expenditures
represent a large percentage of revenue. Comparative advertising is widely used. Tylenol
has the highest market share followed by Advil. The latter is the industry leader in compar-
ative advertising spending, and Tylenol is by far the main target of comparative advertising
by other brands. Comparative advertising represents only a small percentage of Tylenol's
advertising expenditure which is the largest in the industry. The behavior of Tylenol is quite
consistent with our model, although it does use some comparative advertising. This might
be partly explained by allowing a persuasive component to advertising, which is missing
from our model. To properly account for the other brands' behavior, it would be useful to
extend the model to oligopoly to predict the relation between market shares and comparative
advertising activity (both advertisers and targets). As noted in the text, there is a con
ict
between expanding demand and triggering lower rival prices when there is more information,
and with several rms there are multiple subsets of information that can be revealed. A free
rider problem might arise among the smaller rms, and they also are likely to gain less than
27http://www.brainposse.com/archivejujitsu1.html
35some larger rivals (by dint of their lower initial qualities). This means that an oligopoly
extension does not follow trivially from the results here, although we hope to have identied
the main tensions at play.
10 Conclusions
Comparative advertising involves informing consumers of characteristics of rival products.
On the surface, the practice would appear socially benecial (assuming of course that the
advertising is not misleading) and should lead to better informed choices. It has though
been pointed out that it may relax price competition (and lead to higher prices) because it
increases product dierentiation. However, this is also true for direct advertising, so a useful
theory should also explain when it is used and not.
The theory proposed here does this by focussing on intrinsic quality dierences in the
products sold. If these qualities are quite similar, rms have enough incentive to advertise
their own products and comparative advertising plays no role. This is true in a balanced
market with rms that have similar market shares. Only if market shares are suciently
dierent does comparative advertising come into play. If it is illegal, the strong rm may
not need to advertise, and the weak rm may be overwhelmed. If comparative advertising is
legal though, the weak rm can improve its consumer base and survive by using advertising
that targets the dominant product and compares characteristics. Thus, the model predicts
that comparative advertising is used by weaker rms targeting market leaders. This is in
line with most instances in practice.
The model also delivers a salutary message for comparative advertising. It enables weaker
rms to increase sales, and, in some instances, to survive. The dominant rm eectively
parlays its quality advantage into both a high mark-up and high sales, although this is more
acute when only one product's information is advertised, a case where the weaker rm may
36be driven out of the market. The paper shows that the informational benets of comparative
advertising may be overwhelmed by excessive sales by the low-quality rm, which is harmful
for very large quality dierences. However, some caveats are worth drawing. First, even
when total welfare falls, it may be that consumer welfare rises since comparative advertising
(full information) may be associated with lower prices when quality (or cost) dierences are
large enough. Second, such lower prices might entail a lower deadweight loss if the model
were extended to allow for non-purchase options.
The modeling approach is based on truthful informative advertising of horizontal charac-
teristics with rational consumers. The approach was chosen to portray comparative adver-
tising in a favorable light by allowing the conveyance of more hard information. If consumers
were not rational (rationality is embodied in the model in the assumption that consumers
form correct expectations of mean valuations in the absence of information), they might be
manipulated by misleading advertising. The legal system may play an important role in
ensuring truthfulness in this context.
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3911 Proofs
11.1 Lemma 1
Assume that Q  0. We rst show that  = Q or  = 0 imply that Q = 0. Assume rst
that  = Q, so that p0 = p1 = p. Then, in order for Firm 0 not to wish to deviate, for any
real number    p we must have
p[1   D1(Q)]  (p + )[1   D1(Q + )];
which is equivalent to
(p   )D1(Q + )  pD1(Q) + [1   2D1(Q + )]:
If Q > 0, then for any  2 ( Q;0], D1(Q + ) > 1
2 and thus [1   2D1(Q + )] > 0. Then
Firm 1 could deviate from p to p  so as to earn a prot of (p )D1(Q+) which strictly
exceeds pD1(q). So we must have Q = 0 in order for  to be equal to Q in equilibrium.
Now suppose that  = 0 so that p0 = p1   Q. Then, for any  > 0 we must have
1
2
(p1   Q)  (p1   Q + )[1   D1()];
or, equivalently,
(p1   )D1() 
1
2




If Q > 0, since  > 0 so that D1() > 1
2, for  suciently small, the right hand side strictly
exceeds 1
2p1. Firm 1 would therefore be better o charging p1    rather than p1. Thus in
order for  to be zero in equilibrium we must have Q = 0:
We now show that in equilibrium 0    Q which, along with the results above, proves
the Lemma for Q  0. First, it is necessary that Firm i prefers pi to its rival's price so that
p0[1   D1()]  p1[1   D1(Q)]
40and
p1D1()  p0D1(Q):
Adding these two inequalities and rearranging yields
p0   p1  (p0   p1)[D1(Q) + D1()]: (9)
Since Q  0, if p0 > p1, then D1() > D1(Q)  1
2. Thus D1(Q) + D1() > 1 which
contradicts inequality (9). So we must have p0  p1, or equivalently   Q.
It must also be the case that Firm i prefers charging pi than a price that would set  to
zero, so that









Adding these two inequalities yields
[1   D1()]p0 + D1()p1 
1
2
(p0 + p1): (10)
We know from above that p1  p0. If p1 > p0, inequality (10) requires that D1()  1
2 and
therefore   0. If p1 = p0 then  = Q  0. This completes the proof for Q  0.
Similar arguments establish the result for Q  0. Q.E.D.
11.2 Lemma 2
If  < ` or  > u, then whichever rm has a demand of 1 could increase its price without
losing any demand and thus, increase it prot; this proves the rst part of the Lemma.
We now show that dierentiability at k implies that  = k cannot be an equilibrium.
For instance for k = u, dierentiability at u implies that the left derivative of D1 at u is
0 (since the right derivative is zero). Then Firm 1's prot derivative is D1(u) = 1 > 0 so
that Firm 1 would deviate and increase its price. Similarly, if  = `, Firm 0 would wish
to increase its price from the candidate equilibrium. Q.E.D.
4111.3 Proposition 1
The argument for existence is standard (see Caplin and Nalebu, 1991).
Before going through the 3 cases it is useful to note that since D1 and D0 = 1   D1 are
strictly log-concave, g is strictly decreasing on [`;u] and so the right-hand side of equation
(3) (the equation is Q =    g ()) is strictly increasing on that same interval. This shows




Di, i = 0;1 is strictly increasing,
prices are uniquely determined by equation (1). It also shows that in this case  must be
strictly increasing in Q. Implicit dierentiation of (3) and Assumption 2 imply d
dQ < 1.
First consider case 3. If   `, then Firm 1 makes zero prot whereas, since Q > 0.
it could obtain a strictly positive prot by charging, for instance, a price p0 + Q > 0. Next
note that u + 1
D
0
1(u) is the right-hand side of (3) evaluated at  = u. Since Q is at
least as large and the right-hand side of (3) is strictly increasing on (`;u), there is no 
in that interval that satises (3). Since an equilibrium exists and using Lemma 2, we must
have  = u. We also know from Lemma 2 that this case may arise only if D
0
1(u) > 0 so
that Firm 0's prot left derivative with respect to p0 is  p0D
0
1(u) which would be negative
if p0 > 0 and thus Firm 0 would wish to decrease its price. Thus we have p0 = 0 and the
expression for p1 follows.
Case 2 may be treated with symmetric arguments.
Now consider case 1. We show that we may not have  = u and a symmetric argument
would show that we cannot have  = `. From Lemma 2, this suces to complete the
proof. Hence suppose that  = u. As was shown above, we must then have p0 = 0. The
right derivative of Firm 1's prot is given by 1   p1D
0
1(u) = 1   (Q   u)D
0
1(u). Since
Q < D1(u) + 1
D
0
1(u) the right derivative of prot strictly exceeds 0. Then Firm 1 could
increase its prot by increasing its price.
For part 4, the limit result follows from case 3 if D
0
1(u) > 0. Otherwise, if D
0
1(u) = 0,
42(2) and (3) can only hold when  ! u for Q ! 1 since g () is nite for  < u.
For part 5, the equilibrium  increases in Q and strictly increases in case 1. Since D1
increases in , D1 increases in Q and D0 decreases in Q. To complete the proof it suces to
show that p1 strictly increases in Q whenever D1 > 0 and p0 strictly decreases in Q whenever
D0 > 0. This is immediate in cases 2 and 3. In case 1 prices are given by (1). Since D1 and
D0 are assumed to be strictly log-concave, p1 strictly increases in  and p0 strictly decreases
in  which proves the result since  strictly increases in Q in case 1. Q.E.D.
11.4 Proposition 3
From symmetry of f, equality clearly holds if  = 0. We now show that the inequality holds
strictly for  > 0. Symmetry of f implies
Z b
 b
F(r + )f(r)dr =
Z 0
 b






Hence it suces to establish that F(r + ) + F( r + ) < 2F() for all r < 0. This is
equivalent to








Using appropriate changes of variables, this condition may be rewritten as
Z  r
0




Since  > 0, quasi-concavity and symmetry of f around zero implies that f(+t) < f( t),
for all t 2 (0; r]. This ensures the proper inequality.
Symmetric arguments establish reverse inequalities for  < 0. Q.E.D.
43Figure 1. Profits for Laplace distribution.
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